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Abstract
In many countries, the president is involved in appointing judges.
Does this lead to selection of friendly judges who then promote the
president’s interests? This question is explored here in the context of
Russia, where judges are often said to favour the executive.
I gather data on 2000 court cases, and analyze them by exploiting
changes in the appointment rules. I find clear evidence that judges
selected by the president favour the government more than do their
peers. In the process, the paper develops a new solution to the sample
selection problem endemic to the analysis of court decisions.
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1 Introduction
In most societies the president is directly involved in selecting judicial can-
didates. This paper investigates the impact of this on judicial decisions.
The paper makes three contributions. First, it provides robust empirical
evidence on that judges selected with presidential involvement are more likely
to favour the government. Second, it does so in the context of Russia – a
trouble-ridden democracy where the government is often accused of interfering
with law enforcement. Finally, the paper develops a new method for the
empirical identification of the impact of appointment procedures on judicial
decisions.
So far, the evidence on the impact of presidential involvement has been
indirect, and the bulk of it comes from the United States, where democratic
institutions are strong. Arguably, judicial restraint is more important where
such institutions are weak, yet in such societies it is usually harder to collect
the data which would allow to study this issue.
Russia is case in point. A major criticism laid against its democracy is
the unchecked power of its executive government, headed by the country’s
president (Fish, 2005). Russia’s courts have been described as “yet another
tool of presidential power” (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss, 2008).
Although the Russian president has no direct control over the courts, he
has the power to appoint judges. This study investigates whether he uses this
to select judges who then favour the government in their decisions. I exploit
a rare institutional change to construct a direct test of this hypothesis.
The focus here is on Russia’s ‘arbitrazh’ courts which handle all economic
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disputes. These courts were created in 1991, during the country’s rapid shift
to a market economy and democratic regime, in a process overseen by the
Supreme Soviet, without presidential involvement. Two years and 1200 judi-
cial appointments later, the Supreme Soviet was disbanded and Russia’s first
democratic constitution put the president in charge of judicial appointments.
Today, these di↵erently appointed judges work side by side. Do they behave
in di↵erent ways? To answer this question, I collected data on judicial decisions
in disputes involving taxes, regulation, property and contractual rights.
Comparing the decisions of the two types of judges is not straightforward
because they are likely to handle di↵erent cases. For example, if a potential
litigant believes the judge is biased against him, he is more likely to try to
settle the case out of court. Identification of the appointment e↵ect is greatly
impeded by this problem of sample selection1.
This is well known to the scholars who compare US judges appointed by
presidents from di↵erent parties. Ashenfelter et al. (1995) summarize the early
literature which failed to account for sample selection, and make a break with
it by exploiting random assignment of judges to cases in certain trial courts.
He finds no di↵erences across judges2.
More progress has been made by researchers analyzing judicial votes in the
US Supreme Court and in the three member panels of US federal courts of
appeal. Many of them do find significant partisan di↵erences across judges
(Revesz, 1997; Cross and Tiller, 1998; Sunstein et al., 2006; Epstein et al.,
2007; Cox and Miles 2008). The US courts of appeal make an attractive
setting for these tests because panels are randomly assigned to cases, and
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the votes of individual judges in the same case provide an additional source
of variation. Still, the approach runs into di culties if litigants can settle
disputes after the case is allocated to judges, or if judges vote strategically.
Even more importantly, this approach may not be available in other judicial
systems.
By showing that, conditional on the same appointment scheme, di↵erent
US presidents appoint di↵erent judges, the above papers give indirect evidence
on the impact of the presidential involvement in judicial appointments. In
contrast, this paper establishes this impact more directly by demonstrating the
causal e↵ect of a change in the formal appointment scheme which introduced
the president into the process.
This paper also takes a di↵erent approach to solving the sample selection
problem: it leverages data from two levels of judicial hierarchy. To do this, I
coded information on 2000 cases that were heard in Russian courts of appeal
between 1995 and 2002. Appellate courts were created in 1995, with judges
selected with the president’s help. However, in regional courts only about half
of the judges were chosen by the president. My approach is to compare judicial
decisions using two sources of variation in appointment – across judges within
regional courts, and between regional and appellate courts. This identification
technique is a version of the di↵erence-in-di↵erences method.
The main result is that there is indeed a significant appointment e↵ect:
judges appointed by the president side with the government more often than
the rest. A firm litigating against a government agency under a judge ap-
pointed by the president finds its chances of winning reduced from about 55
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to 50%. This confirms the conjecture that the president influences the courts
through appointments.
Furthermore, the concerns about sample selection are well justified: di↵er-
ently appointed judges handle systematically di↵erent cases. These di↵erences
are so large that ignoring them would have led to the opposite conclusion about
the attitude of presidential judges towards the government.
This paper complements existing work on selection of public o cials. With
a few exceptions (such as Prendergast, 2001), this literature has been heavily
focused on voter selection (Osborne and Slivinsky, 1996; Besley and Coate,
1997) and comparison between elected and appointment o cials (Besley and
Coate, 2003; Besley and Payne, 2003; Guerriero, 2011; Lim, 2013). In contrast,
this paper analyzes how appointed o cials are selected.
I begin with a description of arbitrazh courts in section 2. The data are
described in section 3. Section 4 develops empirical identification strategy.
Section 5 contains the main empirical results, and section 6 considers their
robustness and extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2 Russian arbitrazh courts, 1991 – 20023
2.1 Structure and performance
In 1991, during its major political and economic transition, Russia created
arbitrazh courts, a new judicial branch for economic disputes. The Supreme
Soviet, then legislative branch of the government, set up 81 regional courts,
drawing on the existing infrastructure of Gosarbitrazh, a branch of Soviet
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bureaucracy for resolution of economic disputes (Hendley, 1998)4. In 1995, 10
courts of appeal known as okrug courts were added.
Arbitrazh courts deal with disputes over contracts, property rights, taxes,
regulatory decisions, and so on. Judges specialize in an area of law, and court
chairmen use this to allocate cases, though this still leaves a lot of discretion
with the chairmen (Aitkulov and Popelysheva, 2013; Despouy, 2009). Gen-
erally, on paper the system has enviable provisions for judicial independence
(Kahn, 2008), including:
• The judges are appointed until retirement, and their salaries cannot be
reduced.
• All courts are subject to the same federal rules and are funded from
the federal budget. Thus they are formally separated from the regional
authorities5,6.
• Laws prevent litigants from strategically choosing their court7.
Nevertheless, many disagree over how well these courts work in practice.
Generalizing from high profile cases such as the government’s tax evasion law-
suit against oil company Yukos and its CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, some
believe that arbitrazh courts are ine↵ective and lack independence (McFaul,
2001; Black et al., 2000; BBC News, October 31, 2003). The alternative view,
backed by surveys and case studies, is that despite this bad publicity firms rely
on arbitrazh courts for routine disputes (Hendley, 2004; Frye, 2004). Indeed,
several papers have established an empirical link between court performance
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and economic activity in Russia (Johnson et al., 2002a; Johnson et al., 2002b;
Shvets, 2013).
A more detailed look at the evidence suggests that the performance of the
arbitrazh courts depends on who is involved. First, when powerful government
interests are present, this can a↵ect judicial decisions (Lambert-Mogiliansky
et al., 2007), and make firms reluctant to litigate (Frye, 2004).
Second, size matters. Small firms have a lower opinion of the court sys-
tem than large firms, possibly due to their more limited ability to “faciliate”
judicial process through payments and gifts – something that large firms do
significantly more often (BEEPS, 2002).
The analysis below will touch upon both of these observations.
2.2 Appointment process
The history of appointments to arbitrazh courts has two distinct periods:
before and after the 1993 constitution which granted the appointment power
to the president (see figure 1).
h h COMP: Place Figure 1 about here i i
2.2.1 Between 1991 and 1993
The early 1990s were marked by major political turmoil and power strug-
gles. On the one side was the Supreme Soviet, Russia’s legislature largely
inherited from the old Soviet system, and on the other Boris Yeltsin, the
country’s first democratically elected president. In late 1990, the Supreme
Soviet set up the new Supreme Arbitrazh Court and appointed the ex-head
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of Gosabitrazh as its Chairman. In 1991, the Supreme Soviet created 81 new
regional arbitrazh courts and they needed judges. In 56 regional courts, the
law prescribed the following appointment procedure. The Chairman of the
new Supreme Arbitrazh Court was to make a nomination for each post, first
by himself, then with the help of so-called qualifying committees formed from
(recently appointed) senior judges. The Supreme Soviet then approved these
nominations, and made the final appointment (Law No. 1543–1, 1991, Law
No. 3133-1, 1992).
Although the final appointments were recorded, there is virtually no evi-
dence on how this process was implemented, and so it is not completely clear
how big the de facto role of the Supreme Soviet in selecting judges was. We
know that it approved over 1200 judges in the course of two years of extreme
political turbulence, which makes it doubtful that the Supreme Soviet devoted
much time to reviewing the candidates. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that a significant number of judges appointed during this period had
been the members of the Soviet Gosarbitrazh who were moved to a roughly
equivalent position in the new courts8. All of this suggests that the Supreme
Soviet played little role in screening the candidates.
To the extent that it did do such screening, its agenda would have been
very di↵erent from that of the president, with whom it was locked in a power
struggle. Therefore, we will refer to judges appointed in these 56 courts in
1991-93 as ‘non-presidential’, in constrast with the judges appointed after the
adoption of 1993 constitution.
In the remaining 25 regional courts, the procedure was di↵erent to reflect
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the relative autonomy of these regions from the central government. There,
the law put regional authorities in charge of judicial selection. However, the
process was not spelled out in the legislature, and this resulted in a variety of
approaches, some rather ad-hoc (Trochev, 2006). Furthermore, no systematic
record of these appointments exists9. Finally, it is believed that regional elites
in these autonomous regions supported the president (Triesman, 1999), mak-
ing this group of judges less than an ideal control group for the presidential
appointees. For all these reasons, judges appointed in these 25 autonomous
regions in 1991-93 are not included in this analysis.
2.2.2 After 1993
In 1993, Yeltsin disbanded the Supreme Soviet and pushed through a new
Constitution which granted vast powers to the president (McFaul, 2001). One
such power was that of final judicial appointments in all regional arbitrazh
courts. By 2002, about a half of all regional arbitrazh court judges had been
selected with the president’s involvement. On their creation in 1995, okrug
courts of appeal fell under the same rule. Those involved in this process report
that the presidential o ce takes this power seriously and devotes substantial
resources to gathering information on judicial candidates (Trochev, 2006).
This historical change has led to a situation where judges appointed by
di↵erent methods work side by side in regional courts. In contrast, appellate
courts only have judges selected by the president. This generates two sources
of variation in judicial appointments: within regional courts and across the
two tiers of courts.
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3 Data
This section describes the data, which come in three parts: information on
cases, firms, and judges. More details are in appendix A.
3.1 Cases
By reading the texts of decisions provided by Kodeks, a database of legal
documents10, I constructed characteristics of approximately 2000 court cases
(1500 between firms and government, and 500 between two firms). They are
summarized in table 1, and include identities and type of parties, type of
dispute, courts and judges involved, and their decisions, and several other
characteristics. The cases span the period from 1995 to 2002, and 52 regional
courts11.
h h COMP: Place Table 1 about here i i
3.2 Firms
The disputes in the dataset involve a little over 2,500 firms. I group them
into small, medium and large using the information on their name and legal
status (e.g. solo proprietorship, joint stock company, etc.), and where possible
supplement this with the data on employment from the Gnozis and the Alba
databases of Russian medium and large enterprises. Table 1 provides the
breakdown of cases by firm size12.
For a subset of 300 cases, I was also able to get the information on the
sector of the firm, from the Gnozis and the Alba databases (table 2).
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3.3 Judges
Just over 800 judges are involved in the disputes in the dataset: 664 in
regional courts and 142 in courts of appeal. Using the names of the judges
listed in the decision, I matched them to the information on their appointment
gathered from o cial statements of the Supreme Soviet and the President’s
O ce13,14,15.
Table 1 shows the decomposition of the sample by appointment and tier.
We see that in the full sample, the government wins roughly half of the time
against firms. Although selection into litigation prevents us from drawing
strong conclusions, this number is at odds with the view that the system is
so biased in the favour of the state that litigation is pointless (section 2.1).
Yet, as we will see in section 5, behind this balanced win rate lies a signifi-
cant di↵erence in how often di↵erently appointed judges rule in favour of the
government.
4 Empirical identification
4.1 Sample selection problem
As a first pass at investigating the appointment e↵ect we may be tempted to
compare government victory rates for presidential and non-presidential judges
in regional courts. They are 50% and 55% respectively, a statistically sig-
nificant di↵erence at the 5% level (table 1). This seems to suggest that the
president’s judges are harsher on the government – the opposite of our intu-
11
Shvets
12
ition.
However, if di↵erently appointed judges handle systematically di↵erent dis-
putes this conclusion does not follow. The presidential judges may rule in
favour of the government less frequently either because they are harsher or
because they attract di↵erent disputes (e.g. the disputes in which the govern-
ment’s case against the firm is relatively weaker) or both.
Indeed, table 1 shows that there are significant di↵erences in the observable
characteristics of cases handled by di↵erently appointed judges. Presidential
judges are more likely to hear disputes involving the government, particularly
the federal government. They are less likely to handle contracts and property
rights disputes and are more likely to work on regulatory issues; there are also
some small di↵erences in firm’s sector (table 2). This corroborates the con-
cern about sample selection, particularly if the observable features are related
to key unobservable characteristics, which we will call “the strength of the
government’s case against the firm”.
h h COMP: Place Table 2 about here i i
Indeed the literature on litigation has long argued that there will be sys-
tematic di↵erences in this strength across di↵erently appointed judges. There
are two main mechanisms at work: the first is self-selection by litigants, and
the second is allocation of cases within courts.
First of these, self-selection, occurs because potential litigants choose whether
to settle out of court based on the judicial decision they expect (Priest &
Klein, 1984; Bebchuk, 1984; Waldfogel, 1995). If litigants know who will han-
dle their case and that the appointment of a judge matters for the decisions,
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the strength of the government case in disputes that proceed to litigation will
generally be di↵erent for di↵erently appointed judges (see appendix B for a
formal exposition). If the litigants have an option to settle out of court after
the judge has been allocated to their case, self-selection is a concern even if
cases are allocated to judges randomly within courts.
Second, consider non-random allocation of cases within courts. One pos-
sibility is that judges specialize in certain sectors or areas of law. Then if (a)
the strength of government case is di↵erent across these areas of specialization
and (b) di↵erently appointed judges have di↵erent specializations, the com-
parison of government win rates across di↵erently appointed judges will give
a biased estimate of the appointment e↵ect. Another possibility is strategic
behaviour of court chairmen who allocate cases. For instance, if the chairmen
want to help the government and they know that the presidential judges are
more favourable towards it, they may be able to increase the share of govern-
ment victories by allocating cases where the government’s hand is weaker to
such judges. Then, a comparison of government win rates across judges will
understate the true appointment e↵ect.
4.2 Solution with appellate decisions
I address the sample selection problem by considering both appellate and
regional court decisions in each case. Figure 2 shows the four groups for which
the rate of government victories can be calculated in the dataset. ↵ is the
share of government victories in decisions of presidential judges in regional
courts, and   is this share in decisions of appellate judges in the same set
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of disputes. Similarly,   is the share of government successes in decisions of
regional non-presidential judges, and   is this share in the same cases at appeal.
h h COMP: Place Figure 2 about here i i
There are two ways to construct the di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimate of the
appointment e↵ect. First, note that ↵     is the naive ‘horizontal’ estimate
of the appointment e↵ect which, as discussed above, is plagued by the sample
selection problem. Now,     is the di↵erence in government’s success rates at
appeal in cases that have come from di↵erently appointed judges. Since there
is no variation in the appointment of appellate court judges, this di↵erence
captures the underlying di↵erence in the strength of the government’s case
in the two groups of disputes. This is therefore our estimate of the sample
selection e↵ect, and subtracting it from the ‘naive’ estimate ↵   gives us the
estimate of the true appointment e↵ect:
(↵   )  (     )
Alternatively, observe that       is the naive ‘vertical’ estimate of the
appointment e↵ect. It compares the decision of presidential judges at appeal to
those of non-presidential judges in regional courts. This is for the same group
of disputes, so it side-steps the selection problem. However, this estimate
will be biased if there is a ‘tier e↵ect’: a discrepancy in attitudes towards the
government at di↵erent levels of the judicial hierarchy even if the judges are
appointed in the same way.
Fortunately, tier e↵ect can be estimated by     ↵, the di↵erence in gov-
ernment’s success in decisions of the regional and appellate court judges in
14
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the same disputes when both are appointed by the same method (the presi-
dent). The di↵erence between the two gives us an unbiased estimate of the
appointment e↵ect:
(     )  (    ↵)
This helps highlight the key assumption of the identification strategy: that
the tier e↵ect is the same whether the dispute was originally handled by non-
presidential judges (counterfactual) or presidential judges (estimated)16.
Although it is hard to assess the plausibility of this assumption without
a full theoretical model of appellate decision making, we can think of two
broad scenarios when it may be violated. First, if the decision of the appellate
judge directly depends on how the regional court judge had been appointed:
that is, in two identical cases, the appellate judge is more likely to favour
the government if the regional judge had been appointed in a particular way.
Although a theoretical possibility, this is not very plausible and is unlikely to
be a major threat to identification.
Second, since we expect di↵erently appointed judges to handle di↵erent
disputes, the assumption may be violated if the tier e↵ect varies with dispute
characteristics. Though this cannot be tested directly, I will provide indirect
evidence that it does not.
4.2.1 Judicial characteristics
The above analysis ignores numerous characteristics of judges that may af-
fect their decisions. Failing to account for these might bias our results, but only
15
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if these characteristics are also correlated with the appointment. Although it
is not easy to come up with such examples in this context (since the judges
appointed by di↵erent methods adjudicate side by side, in the same courts, at
the same time), one possible threat to identification is that non-presidential
judges had been appointed earlier than their presidential counterparts. For
example, if experience of a judge a↵ects his attitude towards the government,
the appointment variable may pick up the e↵ects that are due to the date
rather than method of appointment. I address this potential concern in the
robustness checks (section 6) by explicitly controlling for the date of appoint-
ment.
5 Main empirical results
5.1 Graphical intuition
Figure 3 is a scatter plot showing the rate of government victories in
regional courts (horizontal axis) and appellate courts (vertical axis). Each
point corresponds to cases heard in a particular regional court, by type of
judge: black filled circles for presidential judges, grey hollow circles for non-
presidential judges. The sizes of circles are propotional to the number of
observations for each regional court.
h h COMP: Place Figure 3 about here i i
The line of best fit for the presidential judges lies below or to the right
of the line of best fit for the non-presidential judges: The di↵erence in the
intercepts is statistically significant at 10% level. This suggests a positive
16
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appointment e↵ect — the presidential judges side with the government more
frequently than do non-presidential judges in disputes that fare similarly at
appeal. This visualization of our di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimate captures
the main result of this paper.
5.2 Mean comparison tests
I present the first set of results in the form of mean comparison tables 3
through 6.
5.2.1 All firms versus government
Table 3 breaks down the sample of all 1500 cases between the government
and firms in the way suggested by figure 2. Each cell reports the mean share of
government victories for regional and appellate judges given the appointment
of the regional judge (out of 100). The standard errors in brackets have been
constructed allowing for a correlation between the decisions of appellate and
regional court judges in the same case.
As discussed in section 4.2, there are two ways of thinking about the
di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimate of the appointment e↵ect. For the ‘verti-
cal’ approach, we first compute the di↵erence in government wins between a
presidential appointee at appeal and non-presidential judge in the region (   
in figure 2), which is 5.3 percentage points here.
Then the tier e↵ect (    ↵) is calculated: it turns out to be small and
insignificant. Subtracting the tier e↵ect from (   ) gives us the final estimate
of the appointment e↵ect. It is positive and significant at the 5% level: judges
17
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chosen by the president are more likely to side with the government than
non-presidential judges in similar disputes. Quantitatively, a firm lowers its
chances of winning against the government by 4.4 percentage points when it
faces a presidential judge.
h h COMP: Place Table 3 about here i i
An alternative way to view the estimate of the appointment e↵ect is through
a ‘horizontal’ comparison of government victories. First find the di↵erence be-
tween government victories in the two appointment groups in regional court
(↵   =  5.2). This estimate is likely to be contaminated by sample selection,
whose e↵ect can be estimated by the di↵erence in government victories in the
same two groups of disputes in appellate court (      =  9.5). By subtract-
ing the selection e↵ect from the naive estimate we find the final appointment
e↵ect: 4.4 percentage points.
Note that the selection e↵ect is di↵erent from zero at the 1% significance
level. This confirms the raison d’eˆtre of our empirical method: that di↵erently
appointed judges attract systematically di↵erent disputes.
Furthermore, the sign of the selection e↵ect implies that presidential judges
in regional courts get disputes in which the government’s case is on average 10
percentage points weaker. This result is unsurprising if either the government
or court chairman acting its on behalf leverage pro-government stance of pres-
idential judges. While we cannot definitively say which is the true channel,
additional evidence presented in Section 6.5 shows that court chairmen play
an important role in facilitating the appointment e↵ect, and so supports the
idea of strategic case allocation by chairmen.
18
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5.2.2 Appointment e↵ect and firm size
Recall that according to surveys, smaller firms in Russia are less happy
with the judicial process and less able to ‘adjust’ it in their favour (section
2.1). This suggests that small firms may su↵er more from pro-government
tendencies of presidential judges than their larger counterparts, who are better
able to counteract unfavourable attitudes of judges with side payments.
To explore this, we break down our sample by firm size and compare sub-
samples of disputes where the government is litigating against a large firm
(table 4) and where it is litigating against a small firm (table 5).
Large firms do not escape the appointment e↵ect: it is still positive, sig-
nificant at 10% level and implies that the probability of winning against the
government for a large firm drops by 8 percentage points (from 50 to 42%)
when a non-presidential judge is replaced with a presidential appointee.
h h COMP: Place Table 4 about here i i
The impact on small firms is similar but starker: the appointment e↵ect is
positive, significant at 1% level and implies a 12 percentage points drop in a
small firm’s probability of winning (from 39 to 27%) when a non-presidential
judge is replaced with a presidential appointee. Although the point estimate
for small firms is 1.5 times larger than that for large ones, the small sample
size implies large standard errors and so the di↵erence, although suggestive, is
not statistically significant.
h h COMP: Place Table 5 about here i i
The division of firms by size has an unavoidable element of arbitrari-
ness. For robustness, we re-estimate the appointment e↵ect for ‘individual
19
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entrepreneurs’, most of whom are street vendors (cigarette sellers, pastry stalls,
etc.), and get very similar results to those using all of the small firms (table
6).
h h COMP: Place Table 6 about here i i
In all subsamples, we continue to find strong selection e↵ects of the same
sign as before – the president’s appointees handle disputes in which the gov-
ernment’s case is significantly weaker. In none of the subsamples do we find
a significant tier e↵ect, which is consistent with the key assumption of our
identification strategy.
5.2.3 Placebo test: Disputes between firms
We now look for a possible appointment e↵ect in disputes between firms,
where the government is not a party. If we find di↵erences there as well, this
would suggest that the di↵erences between presidential and non-presidential
judges are not just about their attitude towards the government. Table 7
shows the rates at which large firms (panel A) and small firms (panel B) lose
to other firms. We find no appointment or selection e↵ect in these disputes,
corroborating our earlier finding and its interpretation.
h h COMP: Place Table 7 about here i i
6 Robustness and regressions
We now subject the main results to several robustness tests using regres-
sion estimates. To preview the results, the general message does not change,
20
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although the results are weaker in some of the more demanding specifications.
In the overall sample, the appointment e↵ect remains significant but now at
the 10% level. A strong appointment e↵ect also persists in disputes with small
firms (significant at the 1% level), where robustness tests have minimal e↵ect.
Finally, although the appointment e↵ect in disputes with large firms is now
insignificant in most specifications, the point estimates are the same as those
found in mean comparison tests.
To write down the estimation equation, denote the decision in case i by
di 2 {0, 1}, 1 if it is in favour of the government, and 0 otherwise. The
appointment e↵ect can then be estimated using the following model,
prob(di = 1) = f(↵0 + ↵1R + ↵2P + ↵3RP ), (1)
where R = 1 if the decision is made by a regional judge and R = 0 if by
appellate judge; P = 1 if the judge who decided on this case in the regional
court had been appointed by the president and P = 0 if not; RP is the
interaction of these two dummies. We can estimate the e↵ects of these variables
using both linear and non-linear specifications for f(.). In the linear model,
which is presented first, the coe cients have the following interpretation:
• ↵0 is the mean share of government victories in decisions of appellate
judges in cases originally handled by regional judges not appointed by
the president.
• ↵1 is the naive ‘vertical’ estimate of the appointment e↵ect which ignores
the tier e↵ect.
21
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• ↵2 is the selection e↵ect.
• ↵3 is the appointment e↵ect.
• -(↵1 + ↵3) is the tier e↵ect.
• ↵2+↵3 is the naive ‘horizontal’ estimate of the appointment e↵ect which
ignores sample selection problem.
6.1 Baseline regressions
Table 8 reports the results of estimating the baseline equation (1) using a
linear probability model. The results (columns 1-4) are identical to those we
obtained in mean comparison tests. Allowing for further correlation between
decisions of the same regional judge increases standard errors slightly (columns
5–8). Qualitatively, this pushes the significance of the appointment e↵ect in
the overall sample down to the 10% level. The other qualitative results remain
the same as before. In the remainder of the estimations, we will use these
adjusted standard errors throughout.
h hCOMP: Place Table 8 about here i i
6.2 Confounding factors
The paper has argued that di↵erently appointed judges will handle system-
atically di↵erent cases. Appellate court decisions allow me to correct for this
by capturing all observable and unobservable di↵erences in disputes across the
two groups of judges that matter for judicial decision. If this works well, then
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the estimates of the appointment e↵ect should not change if observable case
characteristics are included into (1).
Table 9, columns 1 – 3 report the results of this exercise. The controls
include:
• the type of case (contract, property rights, tax, regulation, or other);
• whether the government was the plainti↵ in the original dispute;
• whether the government was absent at appellate court hearing;
• the number of months between regional and appellate court decisions;
• whether the dispute involved more than two parties.
The results are virtually the same as in the base line regressions in table 8.
In disputes with large firms, the coe cient is a fraction smaller and this pushes
it out of the significance region. In the subsample with small firms, there is still
a significant appointment e↵ect. The inclusion of case characteristics does not
reduce the size of the selection e↵ect, and this suggests that the unobservable
characteristics that are important for the decision and selection (e.g. the
strength of government’s case) are mostly uncorrelated with observable case
characteristics such as case type.
h h COMP: Place Table 9 about here i i
The regressions consistently estimate the appointment e↵ect as long as
there are no judicial traits that are correlated with both the appointment
procedure (but are not a consequence of it) and the propensity to favour the
23
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government. As discussed in section 4.4, the one potentially serious confound-
ing factor is the timing of appointments: presidential judges were appointed
in later years, and so have shorter tenure and are likely to be younger, less
experienced and may have come from a di↵erent pool of candidates.
The limited data on judicial characteristics make it impossible to control
for these traits. Instead, I exploit the nature of potential changes produced
by the timing of appointment: age, experience and the pool of applicants are
likely to change gradually over time. In contrast, the change in the appoint-
ment procedure was an abrupt one-o↵ shift at the end of 1993. Thus one can
separate the two e↵ects from each other by including in the regression the
date of appointment, a continuous variable which should control for all grad-
ual changes associated with the timing of appointment. Since it may also pick
up the e↵ect of the appointment procedure, its inclusion should also make it
harder to identify the appointment e↵ect.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 in table 9 report the results of estimations which include
the date of appointment. As expected the standard errors on the appointment
e↵ect rise. In the subsample with large firms, the appointment e↵ect is similar
in magnitude to that found earlier but it is no longer significant. In the overall
sample, the appointment e↵ect continues to be significant at the 10% level, and
in the sample with small firms it continues to be significant at the 1% level.
Note that the date of appointment is not significant in any of the regressions.
Furthermore, the results do not change much when we also include the square
of the appointment date to control for potential nonlinearities in the trend.17
I have also re-estimated equation (1) with observable judicial characteristics
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(gender and ethnic minority indicators). The estimates of the appointment
e↵ect do not change.
6.3 Non-linear estimations
To what extent do the regression results depend on the assumption of
the linear probability model? To investigate this, (1) is re-estimated using
probit and logit models, controlling for the key confounding factor, the date
of appointment.
Table 10 reports marginal e↵ects of these estimations for the entire sample,
and the two sub-samples: large and small firms18. A comparison with the ear-
lier linear estimates in columns 4-6 of table 9 shows that qualitative results are
unchanged by shifting to non-linear models, and they are also quantitatively
very similar.
h h COMP: Place Table 10 about here i i
6.4 Fixed e↵ects model
In all of the above estimations, some of the e↵ect comes from comparing
presidential judges in one region to non-presidential judges in another region.
With the exception of autonomous regions before 1994, there is no variation
in appointment procedures across regions, and the key institutional change
occurs before the start of the sample. This means that standard concerns about
di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimates that take advantage of regional variation do
not apply here.
However, the one caveat is that the share of judges appointed by the two
25
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methods does vary from court to court. If this share is correlated with the
court’s attitude towards the government, this may bias the results19.
To address this, I introduce court fixed e↵ects into the linear regression
(table 11). The identification now occurs by comparing di↵erently appointed
regional judges who adjudicate side by side in the same regional court. The
model also includes year e↵ects which help control for the large movements in
aggregate economy during the sample period: Russia’s 1998 economic crisis
and subsequent recovery. Table 8 shows that our results remain virtually
unchanged.
h h COMP: Place Table 11 about here i i
6.5 Court chairmen20
Like rank-and-file judges, court chairmen can also be divided into presiden-
tial and non-presidential appointees, who oversee 35% and 65% of cases in the
sample respectively. Given that the chairmen are said to have a lot of power
in Russia (Despouy, 2009) and are involved in appointment of judges, I now
ask whether the presidential appointment e↵ect particularly flourishes under
the presidential chairmen. This might also provide an indirect indication on
whether the large selection e↵ects found in the data are due to strategic case
allocation by some of the chairmen.
When I re-estimate equation (1) separately for the two types of chairmen,
the appointment e↵ect is now entirely concentrated in courts where the chair-
man has been appointed by the president (table 12). This may be because
the presidential chairmen help select judges that are particularly favourable
26
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towards the government, or because they encourage this stance among the
presidential judges.
In both types of courts, the sign of the selection e↵ect implies, as before,
that the presidential judges get cases where the government’s hand is weaker.
Although the di↵erence in selection e↵ects is not statistically significant, the
point estimate for the presidential chairmen is 1.5 times larger. Together with
the finding above that the presidential chairmen facilitate the appointment
e↵ect, the evidence is suggestive of court chairmen using case allocation to
help the government.
h h COMP: Place Table 12 about here i i
7 Concluding remarks
This study investigated whether powerful politicians could bridge the sep-
aration of powers by appointing friendly judges. It focussed on Russia, where
relatively new democratic institutions struggle to keep the power of politicians
in check, and the need for an independent judiciary is particularly pronounced.
It is di cult to gather data that can be analyzed for evidence of politicians
interfering with the judiciary in any context. It is particularly hard to do
in countries where such interference matters the most. A change in judicial
appointment rules during Russia’s chaotic transition from the Soviet state
provided us with a window through which to gather the otherwise illusive
evidence of the government’s influence over the judiciary.
The findings show that the appointment process matters: the president
27
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selects judges who are significantly more favourable towards the government.
On average, this helps the government increase its chances of winning from
50% to 55%: i.e. the appointment tips the scales in government’s favour overall
by changing the decision in 5% of cases, without being pivotal for the rest.
Perhaps more of a concern is the size of appointment e↵ect in cases with small
firms, where getting a presidential judge shifts the probability of government
winning from 62% to 74%.
Generally, the size of the estimated appointment e↵ect will depend on the
sample of cases considered, and so care must be taken when generalizing the
results to other contexts. However, the approach developed in this paper of
using appellate decisions as a solution to the sample selection problem can be
applied to studying judicial attitudes in other settings. The key requirement
is that the judicial characteristics that induce the di↵erences in attitudes vary
within at least one court tier. The method may be particularly useful for
other countries with weak institutions where politicians might interfere with
the judiciary and strategic case allocation may be allowed to flourish.
More generally, the paper contributes to the literature on design of institu-
tions. This literature has mostly focussed on the incentives of public o cials,
while the evidence here demonstrates that the process of selection also has
serious consequences. Further understanding selection as well as its interplay
with incentives are important directions for future research.
28
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Appendix A
Data sources
The data come from three sources. Case data were created by reading and
coding the texts of appellate court decisions obtained from Kodeks, a com-
pany supplying legal information. Information on appointment of judges was
collected from the documents of the Supreme Soviet and presidential o ces,
available in Konsultant+ legal information database and the president’s o ce
website. The data describing employment of firms participating in court cases
were taken from their financial reports in the Gnozis and Alba databases21.
Sample
Initially, a sample of 80 decisions was drawn for each of 81 regional courts,
aiming at an equal number of disputes that involved a) only firms, b) a federal
government agency, c) a regional government agency, and d) a local govern-
ment agency. Within each category, the disputes were sampled randomly.
Several small courts contained less than 80 decisions in Kodeks databank in
total.
The final data set contains 2,028 decisions from 52 regional courts. The
main filter in going from the initial to final sample was whether the court case
included names of the judges who handled it – the information critical for us
to establish how the judge was appointed. This first of all meant dropping
29 courts where the names of judges are virtually never reported22. I also
dropped the cases from autonomous regions handled by a judge who was not
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in the database of all presidential appointees23. Of the cases in the final sample,
1,499 are between a firm and a government agency, and 529 are between two
firms.
Variables
Characteristics of judges:
Ethnic minority is equal to 1 if the last name of the judge has a non-Russian
ethnic origin, and zero otherwise. These include names of Kazakh, Tartar,
Armenian, Georgian, Lithuanian, German, Polish, Finnish, Ukrainian, and
other origins.
Date of appointment is the number of quarters between the appointment
of the judge and December 31, 1991 (fractions allowed).
Case participants:
Government agencies include branches of and agencies reporting to federal,
regional, and local executive governments in Russia.
Small firms include firms with less than 150 employees, and where the data on
employment are not available, individual entrepreneurs, solo proprietorships,
cooperatives, farms, and full liability partnerships.
Large firms include firms with more than 650 employees, and all publicly
traded companies except those with less than 250 employees.
Firm’s sector is the sector in which the disputing firm operates. This was
gathered for all firms in approximately 300 firm v. government cases. They
include
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(a) all firms which could be matched to Gnozis and Alba databases, and
have data on sector there. These are typically larger industrial firms.
(b) all firms that could be identified as a bank or a non-profit organization
from their legal status in the decision texts.
Case characteristics:
More than two parties involved is equal to 1 if either on the side of the
defendant, or the plainti↵ there is more than one entity involved in the dispute.
Government absent from appellate hearing is equal to 1 if there was no
government representative at appeal.
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Appendix B
This formal framework demonstrates that if di↵erently appointed judges
have di↵erent attitudes towards the government, they will generally attract
disputes with di↵erent underlying strength of government case. The premise of
the model is that potential litigants diverge in their estimates of their chances
of winning: overoptimistic forecasts then lead to litigation (Priest and Klein,
1984; Waldfogel, 1995; Yildiz, 2004).
The set up
Consider a population of disputes between two parties indexed by i 2
{F,G} : a firm on the one side and the government on the other. M is the
government’s claim against the firm; for simplicity the same across disputes24.
Disputes vary in the strength of the government’s case for this claim which
is denoted by s. The costs of litigation C > 0 are born by each litigant, and
satisfy 2C < M.
There are two judges, indexed by P 2 {0, 1} where 1 is the presidential
judge, and 0 is the non-presidential judge. Each case is assigned to one of
them, and this assignment is independent of s.25
In each case, a judge observes s and decides in favour of the government if
s > tP , where tP a threshold which captures the attitude of judge P towards
the government.
Disputing parties do not observe s, but each forms a noisy estimate denoted
sˆi before going to court. The parties know which judge will handle their case
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and tP before they decide whether to litigate26. The timing is this:
1. The parties form expectations about s.
2. They learn whether P = 1 or P = 0 judge will handle their case.
3. The parties try to settle out-of-court. If out-of-court negotiations break
down the case goes to court.
Selection into litigation
At the third stage, party i expects the government to win if sˆi > tP . If
both parties expect the government to win, the firm can make an o↵er to
the government (M +C) which exceeds the o↵er the government is willing to
accept (M  C). Hence the parties will settle the dispute out of court. Similar
logic applies if both expect the government to lose.
In contrast, litigation will go ahead if both the government and the firm
expect to win27, i.e. if
sˆG > tP , and sˆF < tP . (B1)
Proposition 1 The distribution of s in litigated disputes handled by a regional
judge depends on his threshold.
Proof. Denote the probability density of s in the population by h(s). As-
sume that both parties draw their estimates of s from the same conditional
distribution, denoted F (sˆ|s) with a corresponding density f(.).
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For a given tP , a dispute with the strength of government case s goes to
court if (B1) is satisfied. This gives rise to the following conditional probability
density of s among disputes that go to court
k(s|tP ) = h(s)[1  F (tP |s)]F (tP |s)R
h(x)[1  F (tP |x)]F (tP |x)dx. (B2)
Since k(s|tP ) is a function of tP , in general the two judges will end up with
cases that have di↵erent distributions of s.
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Notes
1In contrast to sample selection in other contexts, selection into litigation typically cannot
be addressed by Heckman’s two-stage procedure since the researcher usually knows nothing
about the disputes that do not reach courts. There are however some notable exceptions
(Sieg, 2000).
2Random allocation in some US courts has also been used to establish evidence of ideolog-
ical disparities across judges that are not necessarily linked to their observable characteristics
(Abrams et al. 2012, Anderson et al., 1999).
3After 2003, the system underwent a number of changes but these are beyond the scope
of this paper, which analyzes data up to 2002.
4The Supreme Arbitrazh Court was established at the same time.
5The exception are appointment rules in ‘autonomous’ regions in early 1990s. We discuss
this in subsection 2.2.1.
6Absence of cross-court variation in institutional arrangements also means that many
standard concerns about natural experiment estimations do not apply to this paper.
7First, the plainti↵ is required to sue in the court of the region where the defendant is
o cially registered. Second, decisions of each regional court can only be appealed to one
specific okrug court.
8For example, see Ivanovo Arbitrazh Court (2015).
9Though to some extent this information can be reverse engineered from the other data
assembled for this paper.
10www.kodeks.ru
11After the introduction of appellate courts in 1995, it took some time before they became
widely used. As a result, the bulk of the cases in the sample is between 1998 and 2002.
12See Appendix A for definitions of firm sizes. Alternative definitions do not have much
e↵ect on the results.
13Not all regional courts publish names of judges in the texts of decisions, and so the
sample had to be restricted to 52 out of the 81 regional courts (see appendix A).
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14The o cial statements were taken from Konsultant+ database (http://www.consultant.ru)
and the web site of the President’s O ce.
152/3 of regional decisions in the sample are made by one judge, and 1/3 by a three judge
panel. In the latter cases, I use the appointment of the panel’s chair, to reflect the belief that
the chair has a disproportionate influence on the decision. This view is shared by several
lawyers and judges I interviewed. All appellate court decisions are made by a panel of three
judges, all appointed by the president.
16This assumption is the equivalent of the common trends assumption usually made in
the di↵erence-in-di↵erences identification.
17The sizes of coe cients remain the same, while some standard errors rise. As a result, in
the overall sample, the appointment e↵ect is no longer significant. It remains significant in
the subsample with small firms at 1% level. Date of appointment squared is never significant.
18The marginal e↵ects are estimated in the way that is meaningful given our setting: (1)
The marginal e↵ect of R is estimated at P = 0, RP = 0, and the average date of appointment
of appellate and regional P = 0 judges. (2) The marginal e↵ect of P is estimated at R = 0,
RP = 0, and the average date of appointment of appellate judge. (3) The marginal e↵ect
of RP is estimated at R = 1, P = 0, and the average date of appointment of P = 0 judges.
Finally, the marginal e↵ect of the date of appointment is estimated at the median of the
rest of the independent variables.
19One example of how such correlation may arise is this: if the president fails to appoint
new judges and the court is understa↵ed, existing judges may express their discontent with
the government in their judicial decisions. An estimate of the appointment e↵ect using
cross-regional variation would then overstate the true e↵ect.
20I am grateful to an anonymous referee and the editor for suggesting this analysis and
interpretation.
21These databases are described in detail in Bessonova et al., 2003.
22Out of the remaining 52 courts, 34 consistently report judge names, and 18 sporadically.
23As discussed in section 2, such judges must have been appointed in 1991-1993 potentially
in an ad-hoc way that was characteristic of autonomous regions in those years.
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24Thus, to break the symmetry, the government is always the plainti↵ in the initial dispute.
Changing this does not a↵ect the results.
25This simplifying assumption is needed to keep the focus of the framework on litigant
self-selection.
26The result is unchanged if we allow litigants to observe tP with noise.
27In this case, the government expects to gain M   C and the firm expects to lose C as
a result of litigation. Since 2C < M , the parties will not be able to agree on a settlement
amount and the case will go to court.
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Figure cations
Figure 1. Judicial appointments in arbitrazh courts
Figure 2. Di↵erence-in-di↵erences (share of government’s victories)
Figure 3. Share of government victories, by regional court
42
Court tier Regional Appellate
Appointment Presidential Presidential
(1) (2) (3)
Number of cases 1019 1009 2028
Number of judges 340 324 142
Characteristics of judges
Men 0.34* 0.26 0.30
Ethnic minority 0.21** 0.12 0.11
Date of appointment 22.9** 2.9 14.6
(quarters since Dec 31, 1991)
Court chairman appointed by president 0.48** 0.23 1
Reversal rate 0.18 0.17 n/a
Cases involving the government
Share in total 0.76** 0.71 0.74
In cases involving the government
Share of government victories 0.50* 0.55 0.55
Characteristics of cases
With federal government 0.50 0.52
With regional or local government 0.50 0.48
With small firm 0.29 0.25 0.27
With large firm 0.24 0.27 0.25
Contract 0.25 0.23
Tax 0.37 0.35 0.36
Regulation 0.25** 0.18 0.21
Property rights 0.07* 0.12 0.10
Government plaintiff 0.37 0.37 0.37
Government absent from appellate hearing 0.60 0.56 0.58
Months between 4.3 4.2 4.3
       regional & appellate decisions
More than two parties involved 0.06 0.07
Table 1.  Judges and cases1
Non-
presidential
0.54+
0.46+
0.21+
0.08+
1Unless otherwise stated, the numbers are expressed as shares of the relevant total
** significantly different from column (2) at 1% level, * 5% level, + 10% level
Table 2.  Composition of cases by firm's sector (share)
Regional judge appointment
Presidential Non-presidential
(1) (2)
Banking 0.21 0.15
Food 0.16 0.18
Machinery 0.11 0.13
Wood & paper 0.06* 0.13
Fuel 0.11 0.09
Metals 0.11 0.06
Building materials 0.05 0.08
Misc industry 0.08 0.07
Non-profit 0.05 0.06
Textiles 0.05 0.02
Chemical 0.02 0.02
Total number of cases 133 163
All cases include government as one of the parties
** significantly different from column (2) at 1% level, * 5% level, + 10% level
Table 3. Firm v government: Share of government victories
Court tier Regional court appointment Difference
Presidential Non-presidential
Regional 49.6 54.8 -5.2*(1.8) (1.9) (2.6)
Appellate 50.5 60.1 -9.5**(1.8) (1.8) (2.5)
Difference 0.9 5.3** 4.4*(1.6) (1.5) (2.2)
Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 4. Large firms v government:  Share of government victories
Court tier Regional court appointment Difference
Presidential Non-presidential
Regional 44.3 49.5 -5.2(3.7) (3.6) (5.1)
Appellate 42.1 55.1 -13.1**(3.7) (3.6) (5.1)
Difference -2.2 5.7*(3.5) (2.8) (4.5)
Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 5. Small firms v government:  Share of government victories
Court tier Regional court appointment Difference
Presidential Non-presidential
Regional 59.5 61.1 -1.7(3.3) (3.6) (4.9)
Appellate 57.7 71.7 -14.0**(3.3) (3.4) (4.8)
Difference -1.8 10.6** 12.3**(2.8) (2.9) (4.0)
Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 6. Entrepreneurs v government: Share of government victories
Court tier Regional court appointment Difference
Presidential Non-presidential
Regional 60.9 60.8 0.01(3.7) (4.4) (5.7)
Appellate 60.3 72 -11.7*(3.7) (4.0) (5.5)
Difference -0.6 11.2** 11.8**(3.0) (3.6) (4.6)
Standard errors are in parentheses
** significantly different from zero at 1% level, * 5% level, + 10% level
7.9+
** significantly different from zero at 1% level, * 5% level, + 10% level
** significantly different from zero at 1% level, * 5% level, + 10% level
** significantly different from zero at 1% level, * 5% level, + 10% level
Appointment effectTier effect
Selection effect
Table 7. Placebo tests
A
. Large firm
 defeats against other firm
s (%
)
B
. S
m
all firm
 defeats against other firm
s (%
)
C
ourt tier
R
egional court appointm
ent
D
ifference
R
egional court appointm
ent
D
ifference
P
residential
N
on-presidential
P
residential
N
on-presidential
R
egional
42.4
44.7
-2.3
59.5
61.6
-2.1
(3.7)
(3.5)
(5.1)
(5.4)
(4.6)
(7.0)
A
ppellate
42.9
41.3
1.7
52.4
56.3
-3.9
(3.7)
(3.4)
(5.1)
(5.5)
(4.7)
(7.2)
D
ifference
0.6
-3.4
-4.0
-7.1
-5.3
1.8
(2.7)
(2.9)
(4.0)
(4.7)
(3.6)
(5.8)
Table 8. B
ase line regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
G
ov v A
ll
G
ov v Large
G
ov v S
m
all
G
ov v A
ll
G
ov v Large
G
ov v S
m
all
D
ependent variable:  1 if governm
ent w
ins, 0 otherw
ise
-0.10**
-0.13*
-0.14**
-0.12*
-0.10**
-0.13*
-0.14**
-0.12+
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.03)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.06)
0.04*
0.12**
0.12*
0.12**
0.12*
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.05)
-0.05**
-0.06*
-0.11**
-0.11**
-0.05**
-0.06*
-0.11**
-0.11**
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
0.60**
0.55**
0.72**
0.72**
0.60**
0.55**
0.72**
0.72**
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.05)
0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.01
0.01
-0.02
-0.02
-0.01
   F test statistic
(0.32)
(0.40)
(0.42)
(0.03)
(0.28)
(0.37)
(0.42)
(0.03)
N
um
ber of decisions
2998
754
804
608
2988
752
802
608
N
um
ber of cases
1499
377
402
304
1494
376
401
304
S
tandard error clustering
D
ispute level
R
egional judge level
**, * and +:  significant at 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 level respectively
S
tandard errors are in parentheses
** significantly different from
 zero at 1%
 level, * 5%
 level, + 10%
 level
G
ov v E
nt
G
ov v E
nt
S
election effect (α₂)
A
ppointm
ent effect (α₃)
0.08
+
0.04
+
0.08
+
N
aive 'vertical' estim
ate (α₁)
C
onstant (α₀)
Tier effect (-α₁-α₃)
Table 9.  C
ontrolling for potentially confounding factors
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
G
ov v A
ll
G
ov v Large
G
ov v S
m
all
G
ov v A
ll
G
ov v Large
G
ov v S
m
all
D
ependent variable:  1 if governm
ent w
ins, 0 otherw
ise
-0.10**
-0.16**
-0.13*
-0.10**
-0.13*
-0.14**
(0.03)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.06)
(0.05)
0.07
0.13**
0.07
0.17**
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.06)
-0.05**
-0.06*
-0.11**
-0.06**
-0.06
-0.13**
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.04)
-0.01
-0.13
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.14)
Tax
-0.11**
-0.12
(0.03)
(0.07)
(0.07)
R
egulation
-0.02
0.06
(0.04)
(0.08)
(0.08)
O
ther
-0.03
-0.14
-0.09
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.09)
G
overnm
ent plaintiff
-0.03
0.01
-0.04
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.06)
G
overnm
ent absent
0.03
-0.02
0.03
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.05)
M
onths betw
een tw
o decisions
0.01*
0.02*
0.01
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
M
ore than tw
o parties involved
0.03
0.03
0.14
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.12)
D
ate of appointm
ent
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
    (quarters since D
ecem
ber 31, 1991)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.58**
0.53**
0.76**
0.61**
0.55**
0.75**
(0.04)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.05)
0.01
-0.02
-0.02
0.00
-0.02
-0.05
  F test statistic
(0.21)
(0.21)
(0.41)
(0.00)
(0.15)
(1.40)
N
um
ber of cases
1488
375
398
1481
372
398
**, * and +:  significant at 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 level respectively
S
election effect (α₂)
A
ppointm
ent effect (α₃)
0.05
+
0.06
+
N
aive 'vertical' estim
ate (α₁)
P
roperty rights
1
-0.25
+
-0.12
+
-0.14
+
C
onstant (α₀)
Tier effect (-α₁-α₃)
S
tandard errors are in parentheses. They are clustered at regional judge level
1 O
m
itted category of dispute is contract
Table 10.  N
on-linear regressions - m
arginal effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
G
ov v A
ll
G
ov v Large
G
ov v S
m
all
G
ov v A
ll
G
ov v Large
G
ov v S
m
all
D
ependent variable:  1 if governm
ent w
ins, 0 otherw
ise
S
election effect
-0.10**
-0.13*
-0.14**
-0.10**
-0.13*
-0.14**
(0.03)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.06)
(0.05)
A
ppointm
ent effect
0.07
0.18**
0.07
0.18**
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.06)
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.06)
N
aive 'vertical' estim
ate
-0.06**
-0.06
-0.13**
-0.06**
-0.05
-0.13**
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.04)
D
ate of appointm
ent
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
N
um
ber of cases
1481
372
398
1481
372
398
**, * and +:  significant at 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 level respectively
S
tandard errors are in parentheses.  They are clustered at regional judge level
S
ee paper for how
 m
arginal effects w
ere calculated Probit
Logit
0.06
+
0.06
+
Table 11.  Fixed effects estim
ations
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
G
ov v A
ll
G
ov v large
G
ov v sm
all
D
ependent variable:  1 if governm
ent w
ins, 0 otherw
ise
-0.08*
-0.12*
-0.08
(0.03)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
0.07
0.13**
0.12*
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.05)
-0.05**
-0.11**
-0.11**
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
0.68**
0.61**
0.77**
0.74**
(0.08)
(0.19)
(0.11)
(0.12)
0.01
0.00
-0.02
-0.01
  F test statistic
(0.21)
(0.20)
(0.39)
(0.03)
N
um
ber of cases
1490
375
400
303
R
egressions include regional court fixed effects and year effects. O
m
itted are C
helyabinsk court and year 2000
**, * and +:  significant at 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 level
S
tandard errors are in parentheses.  They are clustered at regional judge level
G
ov v ent
S
election effect (α₂)
-0.10
+
A
ppointm
ent effect (α₃)
0.05
+
N
aive 'vertical' estim
ate (α₁)
-0.06
+
C
onstant (α₀)
Tier effect (-α₁-α₃)
Table 12. Court chairmen and appointment effect
(1) (2) (3)
Gov v All Gov v Large Gov v Small
Dependent variable:  1 if government wins, 0 otherwise
Presidential chairman in regional court
-0.13** -0.14 -0.13
(0.05) (0.91) (0.09)
0.13** 0.15*
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
-0.05 -0.06
   (F test statistic) (3.43) (0.68) (2.1)
Number of decisions 1092 250 330
Number of cases 546 125 165
Non-presidential chairman in regional court
-0.08* -0.16*
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.02 0.04 0.08
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
0.06** 0.01 0.03
   (F test statistic) (9.86) (0.05) (0.59)
Number of decisions 1888 500 470
Number of cases 944 250 235
Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are clustered at regional judge level
**, * and +:  significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
Selection effect (α₂)
Appointment effect (α₃) 0.14+
Tier effect (-α₁-α₃) -0.05+
Selection effect (α₂) -0.12+
Appointment effect (α₃)
Tier effect (-α₁-α₃)
R
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Figure 2.  Difference-in-differences
Share of government's victories
Regional court appointment
Court tier Presidential Non-presidential
Regional α β α-β
Appellate γ δ γ-δ
γ-α δ-β α-β-(γ-δ)
Appointment effectTier effect
Selection effect
Figure 3. Share of governm
ent victories, by regional court
